plished in about 30 days. Commanders, therefore, often preferred the administrative procedure to court-martial, even for offenders they believed merited the more severe penalties a court could impose. Administrative discharge, according to a Judge advocate with Force Logistic Command, "cut out [in] the least expensive way those persons who are not going to succeed, those persons who are nonrehabilitable, and those persons who Just can't hack it."91
'fragging' and Operation freeze
The slang term "fragging," which in aviation referred to the issuing of fragmentary mission orders, acquired a more sinister connotation during the last years of ground combat in Vietnam. The 1st Marine Division concisely defined the new meaning of the term: "a deliberate, covert assault, by throwing or setting off a grenade or other explosive device, or the preparation and emplacement of such a device as a boobytrap, with the intention of harming or intimidating another."93 More specifically, "fragging" usually denoted the attempted murder of an officer or NCO by an enlisted man, often by means of an M26 fragmentation grenade.
American commanders had been attacked by their own men in earlier wars, but in Vietnam the frequency of such incidents increased dramatically and they received extensive and—in some radical groups-sympathetic publicity.93 Ill MAP, like other component commands in Vietnam, had to meet this new threat from within its ranks. During 1970, in the 1st Marine Division, one Marine died and 41 others were injured in 47 fraggings. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Force Logistic Command also had their share of these crimes. FLC suffered the most costly single fragging of the year on the night of 5 February, when a Marine tossed a grenade into the crowded patio of the Maintenance Battalion enlisted men's club. The resulting explosion killed one Marine and wounded 62. Marine commanders reviewing the record of these outrages found little consolation in the knowledge that the U.S. Army problems were even more severe. During 1970, the 1st Marine Division, with its 47 flaggings, had an incident rate of 0.2 per thousand.94
Fraggings in III MAF plagued both secure rear areas and forward positions. In the 1st Marine Division, 62 percent of the assaults during 1970 took place in cantonments near Da Nang; 38 percent occurred at combat and fire support bases, observation posts, and battalion CPs. Clubs and living areas were favorite targets, with grenades typically rolled through a hut or bunker entrance or exploded against a wall. Lower-ranking enlisted men committed most flaggings, commonly against NCOs and junior officers.95 The motives for fragging were as varied as the tensions afflicting III MAF. A few flaggings, including the one in Maintenance Battalion, appeared to have been racially motivated. Others reflected anger and resentment at a particular small-unit leader or were efforts to get rid of an incompetent or particularly aggressive commander. Many flaggings were committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs or for drug-related reasons, for example pusher-buyer disputes or intimidation of informers. Probably the majority of flaggings resulted from individual personality disturbances. Brigadier General Simmons observed:
In a surprising number of cases after it happens ... we learn things like, "Oh, yeah, we were worried about Bill. He'd been acting funny." Or so-and-so said he was going to frag the gunny. ... Or they say, "We were watching him."96
The perpetrators of flaggings were difficult to find, and if found they were even harder to convict. As was true in narcotics cases, enlisted Marines hesitated to turn in their peers, According to Lieutenant General Jones, "We were faced with the typical teen-age no-squeal syndrome." Fear of being fragged themselves if they came forward also helped silence potential witnesses. For the authorities, frustration often resulted. In the Maintenance Battalion fragging, the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) eventually arrested four enlisted Marines, but Marine courts-martial acquitted all the defendants97
In mid-1970. III MAF instituted Operation Freeze, designed to make escape more difficult for fraggers and conviction more certain. Lieutenant General Jones had developed the program during 1969 while commanding the 3d Marine Division. As Commanding General, FMFPac, Jones passed the concept on to Lieutenant General McCutcheon. Jones recalled:
They were having another rash of fragging in III MAF . . - and I went out on a visit there and had a big session with all the division commanders and I told Keith about my division order. And I said, "Keith, you've got to stop this." He agreed . . . of course. So I sent my order to him and he took it, and he wrote a III MAF order based on that order.98
By the end of 1970, most III MAF commands had put Operation Freeze into effect. Under the system, each unit reacted to a fragging or other violent act ac-
